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OPINION OF THE COURT 
           
 
GREENBERG, Circuit Judge. 
 
 Arrott Associates, Ltd., Bernard Miller, and Marc 
Knopfler appeal from an order entered on October 14, 1994, fixing 
the value of a foreclosed and judicially sold property previously 
owned by Arrott at $1,000,000, and dismissing Miller's and 
Knopfler's counterclaim seeking an order marking as satisfied a 
personal judgment entered against them in the foreclosure 
proceedings.  The appeal is only from the dismissal of the 
counterclaim.  The case raises issues which seem to be of first 
impression under the Pennsylvania Deficiency Judgment Act, 42 Pa. 
Cons. Stat. Ann. § 8103 (1982) (the "Act").   
 
    I.  FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
 The action arises in the aftermath of a mortgage 
foreclosure on a property in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania.  The 
plaintiff is the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation 
("FHLMC"), successor to the original mortgagee, and the 
defendants are the appellants, successors to the original 
mortgagor.  Appellant Arrott Associates, Ltd., is a limited 
partnership in which Miller and Knopfler are the general 
partners.  Arrott defaulted on the payments on the mortgage note, 
and consequently FHLMC instituted the foreclosure action in 1990. 
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 FHLMC obtained a foreclosure judgment on April 3, 1992, 
in the district court authorizing a judicial sale of the 
mortgaged property and providing as follows: 
From the monies arising from the sale of the 
mortgaged premises, FHLMC is to be paid the 
sum of $2,494,991.51, together with per diem 
interest and default interest accrued from 
February 3, 1992, to the date of this 
Judgment, and any further costs and expenses 
incurred between January 27, 1992 and the 
date this Judgment is satisfied. 
In an accompanying second judgment, which we shall call the 
personal judgment, the district court ordered the following: 
 It is hereby ORDERED and DECREED that of the 
$2,494,991.51 referred to in the Judgment in 
Foreclosure, defendants, Arrott Associates, Ltd., 
Bernard Miller and Marc Knopfler are jointly and 
severally liable to the Federal Home Loan Mortgage 
Corporation for the sum of $223,288.33, together with 
per diem default interest accruing from February 3, 
1992, to the date of this Judgment, and any further 
costs and expenses incurred between January 27, 1992 
and the date this Judgment is satisfied. 
The court entered the personal judgment because the mortgage 
secured a debt which was largely but not entirely nonrecourse. 
Thus, the personal judgment reflected the court's determination 
of the extent of appellants' personal liability. 
 At the foreclosure sale on March 1, 1994, FHLMC 
purchased the property for $800,000.  Then on March 25, 1994, it 
moved in the district court for confirmation of the sale.  While 
the appellants did not object to the motion for confirmation, 
they moved under the Act for an order compelling FHLMC to deliver 
a satisfaction of the foreclosure and personal judgments.  
 On June 24, 1994, the district court entered a 
memorandum and order confirming the sale and denying the 
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appellants' motion.  The court stated that under the mortgage and 
the note it secured, FHLMC could not have recourse against the 
appellants for the principal and interest, but that the 
appellants were personally liable for "default interest, late 
charges, attorney fees, real estate taxes, water/sewer rents paid 
by FHLMC, and operating expenses, totalling $223,288.33."1  In 
ruling that the sale had not satisfied the personal judgment, the 
court relied on the following paragraph of the mortgage: 
Notwithstanding the existence of any other 
security interests in the Property held by 
Lender or by any other party, Lender shall 
have the right to determine the order in 
which any or all of the Property shall be 
subjected to the remedies provided herein. 
Lender shall have the right to determine the 
order in which any or all portions of the 
indebtedness secured hereby are satisfied 
from the proceeds realized upon the exercise 
of the remedies provided herein.  (Emphasis  
added by district court.) 
The court held that this paragraph allowed FHLMC to apply the 
proceeds from the sale of the property to the nonrecourse portion 
of the foreclosure judgment rather than to the personal judgment. 
 In addition, the court explained that under the Act a 
                                                           
1The court focused on the liability of Miller and Knopfler, 
apparently because as a practical matter Arrott's liability was 
not important.  However, inasmuch as the personal judgment was 
against all three appellants we will deal with them as a group. 
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judgment creditor who purchases real property at a price less 
than the amount of the judgment must petition the court within 
six months of the sale to fix the fair market value of the 
property sold before it can collect the balance of the judgment 
over such value.  If the judgment creditor does not file the 
petition, the debtor is discharged from personal liability.  By 
June 24, 1994, when the court rendered its opinion, FHLMC had not 
petitioned the court to fix the fair market value of the property 
sold but the appellants had not been discharged from personal 
liability as the six months had not expired.  Furthermore, the 
court reasoned that to offset the purchase price of the property 
against the personal judgment would defeat the purpose of the Act 
and "would encourage a judgment creditor to bid only a nominal 
price for the property so as to avoid offsetting any of the 
judgment." 
 On August 24, 1994, FHLMC petitioned the district court 
under the Act to fix the fair market value of the property sold 
at $1,000,000.  The appellants answered that a valuation hearing 
was unnecessary because FHLMC would not be entitled to a 
deficiency judgment inasmuch as its valuation of the property far 
exceeded their liability on the personal judgment and the balance 
of the debt reflected in the foreclosure judgment was 
nonrecourse.  At the same time, the appellants counterclaimed for 
delivery of a satisfaction of the personal judgment.2  On October 
                                                           
2Only Miller and Knopfler filed the counterclaim but as a matter 
of convenience we treat the appellants collectively as the 
counterclaimants.  See note 1, supra. 
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14, 1994, the district court entered an order fixing the fair 
market value of the property at $1,000,000 for deficiency 
judgment purposes and dismissing the counterclaim.  The district 
court did not render an opinion explaining the reason for the 
October 14, 1994 order, as it evidently relied on its June 24, 
1994 opinion which allowed FHLMC to determine the order in which 
the portions of the secured debt would be satisfied by the 
proceeds obtained through the exercise of its foreclosure 
remedies.  The appellants then appealed from the October 14, 1994 
order.   
 The district court had jurisdiction pursuant to 12 
U.S.C. § 1452(f), and we have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1291.  Inasmuch as no facts are in dispute and the appeal 
involves only questions of law, our review is plenary.  Leo v. 
Kerr-McGee Chem. Corp., 37 F.3d 96, 99 (3d Cir. 1994).  We apply 
Pennsylvania law, which the parties agree governs. 
 
II.  DISCUSSION 
 We regard this appeal as involving nothing more than a 
straightforward application of the Act.  With respect to the 
merits, we first point out that the personal judgment was not 
final upon its entry in the sense that FHLMC could execute on it. 
Rather, the personal judgment merely determined the extent to 
which FHLMC eventually could have recourse individually against 
the appellants for payment of the debt secured by the mortgage. 
Thus, the personal judgment indicated that the $223,288.33 for 
which the appellants were liable was a portion of the foreclosure 
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judgment of $2,494,991.51.  Accordingly, FHLMC has recognized 
that to obtain an enforceable judgment against the appellants it 
was obliged, as the district court indicated in its June 24, 1994 
opinion, to follow the procedure in the Act. 
 Subsection (a) of the Act establishes what is called 
the "general rule" in deficiency judgment cases and reads as 
follows: 
Whenever any real property is sold, directly 
or indirectly, to the judgment creditor in 
execution proceedings and the price for which 
such property has been sold is not sufficient 
to satisfy the amount of the judgment, 
interest and costs and the judgment creditor 
seeks to collect the balance due on said 
judgment, interest and costs, the judgment 
creditor shall petition the court having 
jurisdiction to fix the fair market value of 
the real property sold.  The petition shall 
be filed as a supplementary proceeding in the 
matter in which the judgment was entered. 
Subsection (b) deals with failure to notify the debtor of the 
valuation proceedings and is not material here.  Subsection (c) 
initially sets forth the procedure for establishing the fair 
market value of the property sold which we need not describe as 
the parties have agreed on a value of $1,000,000.  Subsection (c) 
then concludes as follows: 
After the hearing and the determination by 
the court of the fair market value of the 
property sold, the debtor, obligor, guarantor 
and any other person liable directly or 
indirectly to the judgment creditor for the 
payment of the debt shall be released and 
discharged of such liability to the judgment 
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creditor to the extent of the fair market 
value of said property as previously agreed 
to by the judgment creditor or determined by 
the court, less the amount of all prior 
liens, costs, taxes and municipal claims not 
discharged by the sale, and also less the 
amount of any such items paid at the 
distribution on the sale, and shall also be 
released and discharged of such liability to 
the extent of any amount by which the sale 
price, less such prior liens, costs, taxes 
and municipal claims, exceeds the fair market 
value as agreed to by the judgment creditor 
or fixed and determined by the court as 
provided in this subsection, and thereupon 
the judgment creditor may proceed by 
appropriate proceedings to collect the 
balance of the debt.  (Emphasis added.) 
 It seems to us that the plain language of subsection 
(c) requires the appellants' release and discharge from liability 
under the personal judgment.  They are, after all, liable to the 
judgment creditor, FHLMC, for the payment of a debt set forth in 
the foreclosure judgment, as the $223,288.33 personal judgment 
partially duplicates the liability in the foreclosure judgment.3 
                                                           
3Of course, under Pennsylvania law, no deficiency judgment can 
issue from a judgment for mortgage foreclosure. 
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Furthermore, the $1,000,000 fair market value for the property 
sold far exceeds $223,288.33.  Finally, FHLMC does not contend 
that the $1,000,000 must be reduced by "the amount of all prior 
liens, costs, taxes and municipal claims not discharged by the 
sale" or by the other deductions provided in subsection (c). 
 What considerations, then, could cause us to reject the 
above result?  There is, of course, the provision of the mortgage 
we already have quoted allowing FHLMC to determine the "order in 
which any or all portions of the indebtedness secured [by the 
mortgage] are satisfied from the proceeds realized upon the 
exercise of the remedies provided [in the mortgage]."  This 
provision, however, is plainly inapplicable because a credit 
against personal liability for the fair market value of the 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
The sole purpose of the judgment obtained 
through an action of mortgage foreclosure is 
to effect a judicial sale of the mortgaged 
property.  Once the foreclosure sale has 
taken place, the purpose of the judgment has 
been fulfilled and it is rendered functus 
officio.  Useless resort to the Deficiency 
Judgment Act of 1941 to establish fair market 
value and thus the net amount of the 
deficiency can in no way change the nature of 
the judgment from a judgment de terris to one 
in personam. 
Meco Realty Co. v. Burns, 200 A.2d 869, 871 (Pa. 1964); see also 
First Seneca Bank v. Greenville Distrib. Co., 533 A.2d 157, 161 
(Pa. Super. Ct. 1987); Kretschman v. Stoll, 352 A.2d 439, 441 
(Pa. Super. Ct. 1975).  If, however, the mortgage was security 
for a loan that was evidenced by a note or bond and was created 
with recourse to other assets of the debtor, the creditor may 
recover the deficiency by obtaining a personal judgment on the 
note or bond and petitioning in that in personam proceeding for a 
fair value determination under the Act.  First Seneca Bank v. 
Greenville Distrib. Co., 533 A.2d at 161; National Council of 
Junior Order of United Am. Mechanics v. Zytnick, 293 A.2d 112, 
114 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1972). 
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property sold is simply not an allocation of the "proceeds 
realized upon" the exercise of any remedy under the mortgage. 
This conclusion is obvious because if a property is sold for a 
nominal amount so that there are no proceeds to allocate, an 
obligor nevertheless must be released and discharged from 
liability to the extent of the fair market value of the property 
sold.  Furthermore, even if we regarded the allocation of 
proceeds provision of the mortgage as applying to the credit for 
the fair market value of the property sold, it could not override 
subsection (c) so as to deny the appellants the release and 
discharge provided in that subsection because subsection (e) of 
the Act provides: 
Any agreement made by any debtor, obligor, 
surety or guarantor at any time, either 
before or after or at the time of incurring 
any obligation, to waive the benefits of this 
section or to release any obligee from 
compliance with the provisions hereof shall 
be void. 
See also Marine Midland Bank v. Surfbelt, Inc., 718 F.2d 611, 614 
(3d Cir. 1983).  The credit for the fair market value of the 
property sold is thus an unwaivable benefit. 
 A second possible reason for deviating from a 
straightforward application of subsection (c) is that arguably 
our result does not further the legislature's intention in 
adopting the Act.  We have recognized that the policy of the Act 
"is to protect debtors against the risk of a mortgagee obtaining 
a 'double recovery'" by purchasing the property for less then 
fair market value and pursuing the debtor for the deficiency, 
thereby recovering more than the debt amount.  Marine Midland 
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Bank v. Surfbelt, Inc., 718 F.2d at 615-16.4  See also Cheltenham 
Fed. Sav. and Loan Ass'n v. Pocono Sky Enter., Inc., 451 A.2d 
744, 748 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1982).  In this case even if the 
appellants are not released and discharged from liability to the 
extent of the fair market value of the property sold and so 
remain liable for the full amount of the personal judgment, FHLMC 
cannot make a double recovery of the debt.  The $1,000,000 fair 
market value, when added to the personal judgment of $223,288.33, 
is far less then the foreclosure judgment of $2,494,991.51.  In 
fact, FHLMC seems destined to suffer a large loss in this case 
which our result will deepen.5   
 The arguably anomalous outcome flowing from application 
of the Act in this case is attributable to the note and mortgage 
providing for personal liability for less than the full amount of 
the debt secured by the mortgage.  Thus, if the appellants had 
been liable for the entire debt secured by the mortgage, a 
deficiency judgment (with adjustments which we need not detail) 
of $2,494,991.51 less $l,000,000, or $1,494,991.51 net, could 
have been entered against them.  If they then paid the deficiency 
judgment, FHLMC would be made whole, as the appellants' payment 
when added to the value of the property would equal the amount of 
the foreclosure judgment.   
                                                           
4We note that the Act by its terms is not limited to foreclosure 
cases, though the litigation under it routinely involves 
foreclosure actions. 
5Of course, if we focus solely on the appellants' personal 
liability and if the policy of the Act is to preclude a creditor 
from making a double recovery with respect to a debt for which 
there is personal liability, then our result is in harmony with 
the policy of the Act. 
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 In this case we could avoid our result, which arguably 
does not further the Act's purposes, by reading "debt" in the 
phrase "person liable . . . for payment of the debt" in 
subsection (c) to mean the entire debt.  Under this construction, 
appellants would not be released and discharged to the extent of 
the fair market value of the property sold. 
 There are, however, several reasons why we will not 
read "debt" in subsection (c) to mean "entire debt."  To start 
with, in ordinary parlance it would be thought that a person 
liable for payment of a portion of a debt is liable, in the words 
of the Act, for "payment of the debt."  Second, FHLMC has not 
suggested in its brief or by its actions that a judgment debtor 
can obtain a release or discharge of the judgment to the extent 
of the fair market value of the property sold only if the debtor 
is liable for the entire debt secured by the mortgage.  In fact, 
FHLMC's actions demonstrate that it believes exactly the 
opposite.  If FHLMC thought that appellants could not obtain the 
benefit of the Act, then it would have been filing what it should 
have regarded as a useless petition when it asked the court to 
determine the fair market value of the property sold, as the 
court determines that value to ascertain the credit to be given a 
debtor against the judgment.  Yet, as the district court 
indicated in its June 24, 1994 opinion, FHLMC "acknowledges that 
it cannot obtain a deficiency judgment against the defendants 
without first petitioning the court to set the fair market value 
of the property."   Indeed, FHLMC concedes that it would not 
contend that if the value of the property sold exceeded the 
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amount of the foreclosure judgment that the appellants would be 
liable on the personal judgment.  To the contrary, in its brief 
it indicates that if the "fair market value of the [p]roperty 
exceeded the amount of the judgment in [f]oreclosure" there would 
not be a deficiency "as a practical matter."  Brief at 7. 
 There is a third reason why we will not read "debt" in 
subsection (c) to mean "entire debt."  It is true that in this 
case, if appellants do not obtain a release and discharge to the 
extent of the fair market value of the property sold, FHLMC 
nevertheless will not make a double recovery of the entire amount 
due on the foreclosure judgment.  But in another case, denial to 
a judgment debtor of a release and discharge to the extent of the 
fair market value of the property sold when the debtor is liable 
for only a portion of the debt, could enable a creditor to secure 
a double recovery.  For example, a debtor might be personally 
liable for 90% of a debt secured by a foreclosed mortgage.  Then 
at a judicial sale the creditor might obtain title for a nominal 
bid to a property equal or almost equal in value to the amount of 
the debt for which there was personal liability.  In that 
situation the creditor nevertheless could execute on a personal 
judgment against the judgment debtor for 90% of the debt unless 
it was required to release and discharge the debtor for an amount 
equal to the fair market value of the property sold.6  The Act 
                                                           
6A foreclosing creditor may be the only bidder at a sale, as it 
can bid up to the value of its judgment by using its judgment in 
place of cash.  See Pa. R. Civ. P. 1149, 3133, and 3181. Thus, a 
foreclosing judgment creditor may be able to obtain title at a 
judicial sale for a nominal bid, as other potential bidders will 
recognize the futility of bidding against the creditor.   
14 
was intended to preclude that result.  Consequently, a reading 
that "debt" means "entire debt" would in some cases frustrate the 
purpose of the Act.   
 There is a final rationale which could be advanced to 
avoid the literal application of the Act and to deny the 
appellants a release and discharge from the personal judgment. 
When appellants were seeking a discharge by reason of the 
$800,000 sale price prior to the district court fixing the 
valuation, the court in rejecting their application indicated 
that if the purchase price of the property was offset 
automatically against a personal liability, a judgment creditor 
would be encouraged "to bid only a nominal price for the property 
so as to avoid offsetting any of the judgment."  FHLMC relies on 
this point on this appeal.  The problem with this rationale to 
avoid the literal application of the Act is that under the Act 
the release and discharge of personal liability to the extent of 
the fair market value of the property sold is not dependent on 
the purchase price at a judicial sale.  Thus, under the Act, the 
purchase price becomes germane only "to the extent" that, with 
certain adjustments, it exceeds the judicially-determined fair 
market value.   
 Consequently, the fact that a judgment creditor 
acquired the property for a nominal bid would not preclude a 
judgment debtor from being released and discharged from liability 
to the extent of the fair market value of the property sold. 
Accordingly, although a judgment creditor might make a nominal 
bid for the property, it would have little incentive to do so to 
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preserve its claim for personal liability against an obligor on 
the debt.  Indeed, at most our opinion will discourage a judgment 
creditor from bidding more than the fair market value for a 
property, a possibility we do not regard as likely, as we think 
that, with or without our opinion, a judgment creditor would not 
be so foolish as to bid more for a property than its value.  See 
Pleasant Summit Land Corp. v. Comm'r, 863 F.2d 263, 273-77 (3d 
Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 901, 110 S.Ct. 260 (1989). 
Thus, we adhere to the plain language of the Act and conclude 
that the appellants are released and discharged from the personal 
judgment.   
 In view of the aforesaid conclusions, we will reverse 
the order of October 14, 1994, to the extent that it dismissed 
the counterclaim, and will remand the case to the district court 
for entry of an order marking the personal judgment against 
Miller and Knopfler satisfied.7 
                                                           
7While as a matter of convenience we have written this opinion 
referring to all three defendants as the appellants, which they 
are, see note 1, supra, we direct the personal judgment to be 
marked satisfied only as to Miller and Knopfler.  Arrott, though 
originally seeking to have both the judgments against it marked 
satisfied, did not join in the later counterclaim seeking that 
relief and the appeal is from the dismissal of the counterclaim.  
 In their reply brief, appellants additionally request 
that the foreclosure judgment be marked satisfied because they 
believe that FHLMC is asserting on this appeal that they are 
personally liable under that judgment.  We will not consider this 
request as it was not raised in the district court and, in any 
event, we are unaware of how a judgment creditor could assert 
that a defendant is personally liable on a foreclosure judgment. 
See note 3, supra.  Of course, we do not intend by our opinion to 
preclude the appellants from making any contentions they deem 
appropriate if FHLMC attempts to enforce personal liability 
against them under the foreclosure judgment.   
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 FHLMC contends that the counterclaim was procedurally 
improper because the only issue before the district court when it 
filed its petition was the fair market value of the property and 
because the district court in its June 24, 1994 order already had 
rejected appellants' claim for satisfaction of the personal 
judgment.  We reject these contentions, as we see no valid reason 
why the appellants should have been required to institute a 
separate proceeding to obtain relief.  See Fed. R. Civ. P. 
60(b)(5).  Furthermore, the fair market value had not been set in 
June so that the appellants could not have relied on that 
valuation to obtain the release and discharge from liability when 
they made their initial application. 
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